Introduction
Since their introduction in the 1930s to explain fluctuations in agricultural production and prices in terms of sequential production readjustments, cobweb models have played a pivotal role in developments in economic dynamics. In the standard model, firms in a competitive industry produce a single homogeneous product; there is a well-defined production period, with the producers' activities being synchronized; producers base decisions on price expectations; and the market-clearing product price is established instantaneously at the end of each period. With the sole inter-temporal link being via price expectations, particular attention has been devoted to their formation. Indeed, it was in the context of cobweb models that adaptive expectations, rational expectations, expectations based on the mean of all past prices and heterogeneous expectations were first analyzed.
It is, however, curious and regrettable that in a context the very essence of which is that production takes time, very little attention has been paid to how producers finance their production activities and to the possibility of their becoming bankrupt. Typically it is assumed implicitly that producers can borrow or lend any amount at a given market rate of interest determined by the overall state of the economy. Certainly a 'perfect' financial capital market is a powerful simplification frequently invoked by economic theorists. In a cobweb model, it seemingly enables theorists to dispense with financial constraints on producer behavior and to concentrate on technological constraints. But it can be a very misleading simplification. Indeed, assuming that producers can borrow any amount at a given interest rate not only does not rule out bankruptcy but makes it particularly likely. Nor is bankruptcy ruled out by assuming that producers pay for inputs at the end of the production period. To Page 2 of 30 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 2 put the matter starkly, the possibility of bankruptcy is necessarily eliminated only if producers rely exclusively on their own financial capital to pay for inputs in advance.
Section 2 sets out the assumptions of our model. Section 3 examines the case where producers can borrow or lend freely at a given interest rate. Looking beyond the usual treatment of the dynamical behavior of price reveals a fundamental problem: borrowing results in bankruptcy. However, this paper is not simply intended as a challenge to standard non-linear cobweb models. In Section 4, following a brief consideration of the case where firms rely exclusively on their own financial capital, we explore the implications of banks limiting what they are prepared to lend to producers. We examine the cases where borrowing limits depend on the values of durable assets available for use as collateral and where they depend on producers' financial wealth levels.
Assumptions
There are N units of a homogeneous durable asset, denoted by L, that is specific to the industry and in perfectly inelastic supply (akin to Ricardian land). Since the ownership and use of 1 (and only 1) unit of L is required for participation in the industry, 1 there are, in any period, N producers, where N is sufficiently large so that each acts as if a price-taker for the product. Producers can acquire other inputs, but they must pay for these at the outset of the well-defined production period using their own financial capital, possibly supplemented by borrowed funds. At the beginning of period t (before entering into any commitments for the ensuing period), the representative firm's total wealth is
A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 
where 1 α > , so marginal cost is increasing. The firm's net borrowing for period t is
where B t < 0 implies having bank deposits on which interest is received. The interest rate, r, on a loan for the duration of the production period is determined by the overall state of the economy and is invariant over time. The firms in the industry earn the same rate r on any bank deposits, so that r constitutes the marginal opportunity cost of the use of own funds in financing the production process.
Producers are motivated by the accumulation of wealth. At the beginning of period t, subject to any financial capital constraint, the representative firm maximizes its expected financial wealth at the beginning of period ( ) 
This definition of expected profit allows for the opportunity cost of own funds used to finance production but does not take account of the opportunity cost of the funds tied up in ownership of L. Once the producer is committed to participation in the industry in the current period, the cost of ownership of L constitutes a sunk cost, and e t π amounts to an expected quasi-rent accruing to the ownership of L.
Output is sold at the end of the period. For simplicity, we assume that the total expenditure, E, on the product of this industry is given and invariant over time, implying a unit elastic product demand curve. The market-clearing price, established instantaneously, is
so that
. Since total revenue is invariant, the realized profit per firm is a strictly monotonically declining function of output: 
Its financial wealth at the end of the period is
The simplest assumption that captures the notion that the market value of 1 unit of L depends on the long-term profitability of its ownership is that it is given by the present value of the receipt in perpetuity of the mean of the representative producer's past profits. That is, 
Unconstrained Borrowing
Suppose initially that firms can borrow any amount at the going market interest rate.
Maximizing expected profit requires that marginal cost equal the expected price:
From (2) and (12),
where (7) and (13) The fixed point is locally stable if
derivative of f evaluated at the fixed point. Expressing it in terms of v q and q confirms that
( )
Therefore, the fixed point is stable if ( )
With naïve expectations, f is strictly monotonically decreasing: the higher is Increasing γ above E γ gives rise to a sequence of period-halving (period-doubling reversed), until a stable period-two cycle is generated at 0.712 γ ≅ . As γ increases towards 1, the amplitude of the period-two cycle increases.
It should be emphasized that our model involves normal assumptions about costs and demand and that, with the assumption of unconstrained borrowing, it constitutes a standard cobweb model. The map f belongs to the class of difference equations analyzed by Hommes (1994) involving adaptive expectations and non-linear but monotonic demand and supply.
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As 0 f q → , the map f tends to a form similar to that analyzed by Onozaki et al. (2000) , who assume naïve expectations but cautious adjustment to the output that maximizes expected profit. But what these studies ignore is whether the long-term behaviors implied by the models are consistent with the long-run financial viability of producers. When this issue is 3 For this class, the difference equations are differentiable and possess a first derivative less than 1. As a specific case, Hommes explores the properties of a map derived from an 'S-shaped' supply curve and a linear demand function. His map has similar properties to our map f (it has two critical points for some 0 1 γ < < and is strictly decreasing at 1 γ = ) and the qualitative properties of the dynamics are substantially identical. A crucial difference is that, since Hommes normalizes prices by using the inflection point of his supply curve as the new origin, his model does not permit an evaluation of profitability. In Region IV, firms do borrow and, sooner or later, they go bankrupt. From Fig. 4 , for most parameter combinations for which the model exhibits complex behavior, firms engage in borrowing and, with no constraints on that borrowing, they go bankrupt.
The incidence of financial crises cannot simply be eliminated by a ceteris paribus increase in demand: increasing E (or reducing N) increases the intercept of the map f and is a destabilizing force. With cyclical or chaotic system behavior, average profit is less than the stationary profit, and fluctuations increase the likelihood of financial crises. Similarly, assuming a demand curve with a constant elasticity other than 1 − does not alter our conclusions in any fundamental way.
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Before considering the nature and implications of borrowing constraints, we make two historical observations. First, whereas the notion of negative average pure profits over the long run may be disquieting to those brought up on the standard neoclassical theory of a 4 Extending the model to incorporate the distribution of part of the representative firm's income to shareholders would complicate further the relationships between average profits, borrowing and the occurrence of bankruptcies. The greater the proportion of income that is distributed, the lower the critical speeds at and above which borrowing and financial crises occur. With such distribution, there can be a range of speeds for which firms borrow regularly without going bankrupt (i.e., A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 10 perfectly competitive industry, it would not have been troublesome to Knight. In his classic work, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, he advanced his strongly-held belief that "business as a whole suffers a loss" (1971, 365) : he argued that entrepreneurs, motivated by the prospect of profits, actually realize negative pure profits on average, and they sustain this essentially through foregoing some of the opportunity costs on those financial or physical resources that they themselves supply to their businesses. Second, in certain respects, our challenge to standard non-linear cobweb models echoes a largely ignored challenge to the linear cobweb model by Buchanan in 1939. He argued that "neither perpetual fluctuation at a given amplitude nor expanding fluctuation is theoretically possible if the supply curve is a competitive supply curve as most writers apparently had in mind in their exposition of the doctrine" since "losses will inevitably exceed profits" (80-81). 5 He notes: "On the special assumption that there is always a group of new producers willing to rush in and dissipate their capitals with each swing of the cycle, the theorem may perhaps be valid" (81).
Constrained Borrowing
Denoting the representative producer's financial capital fund at the beginning of period t by t K , where this comprises both own financial wealth and the maximum that the producer could borrow, the financial capital constraint on output is
Maximizing expected profit subject to (17) To accommodate the entry of a new cohort of producers to replace those that go bankrupt, it is necessary to specify precisely when firms are deemed bankrupt and what the financial position of entrants is. Our banks follow a simple rule: a firm is declared bankrupt if and only if it has a financial debt that is not diminishing. That is, the representative producer is deemed to be bankrupt at the beginning of period t iff
We assume that where durable assets are sold to a new producer cohort, the purchase exhausts the funds of the representative entrant so that there is no own financial capital left for acquiring additional inputs (i.e., 0 t F = for a firm entering at the beginning of period t).
The latter seems the least arbitrary assumption, and it implies at least that new firms get off to a good start since each produces f q and receives the maximum profit in its first period.
The dynamical system is depicted in Fig. 5 Fig. 4 , the system's dynamical behavior is necessarily the same as for the map f for unconstrained borrowing. Therefore, the interesting ( ) , γ α combinations are those in Region IV. For the latter Region, the decomposition that occurs with unconstrained borrowing breaks down.
Since the constraint (17) shifts over time as financial wealth changes, the system's dynamical behavior is considerably more complicated than for unconstrained borrowing.
Pure Internal Finance
Suppose initially that producers must rely exclusively on their own financial capital. With pure internal finance,
This excludes any possibility of bankruptcy: a firm that cannot borrow never falls into debt. 
Credit Rationing
Typically, firms are able to borrow but their ability to do so is constrained. Banks, facing the risk that a borrower may fail to repay the interest and the principal, ration credit. Lending to producers in a wide variety of industries and facing asymmetric information, our banks follow behavioral rules that discriminate between prospective borrowers according to their balance sheets.
6
A natural case to consider first is that where the producers' durable asset L provides collateral for loans. Specifically, suppose that a bank is prepared to lend a producer up to a limit of ( )
Provided that the value of L does not fall, the proceeds from its sale would cover both the principal and the interest, protecting the bank against default. 7 However, in our model, this credit constraint results in the same dynamical behavior as for pure internal finance. The explanation is that, for those parameter combinations for which the firms' own financial capital is insufficient to finance desired input acquisition (i.e., for Region IV in Fig. 4) , long-run average profits are negative; according to (11), the durable asset is effectively worthless (i.e., 0 t V ≅ ) and cannot be used as collateral for a loan.
A more interesting possibility is that banks discriminate between producers according to their financial wealth levels. This would be equivalent to basing the limit on the own 6 In their macro-analysis of business cycles, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) examine the significance of the creditworthiness of borrowers being dependent on their net worth.
7 In their analysis of credit cycles, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, 218 ) invoke a similar borrowing constraint. In their rational expectations model, agents have perfect foresight of future durable asset prices.
A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 14 financial capital that producers risk in production, for example, where banks are prepared to 'match' the own funds invested by borrowers. Following Day (1967 Day ( , 1994 and Day et al. (1974) , suppose that banks are willing to lend up to a multiple θ of a producer's own financial capital, where 0 θ > reflects the degree of cautiousness of the banking community.
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The representative producer's financial capital fund, including possible borrowed funds, is then ( )
Note well that, since a firm in debt cannot borrow, the simple bankruptcy rule (19), plausible for an individual bank that lacks information about the industry, turns out to be a sensible one for the banking community as a whole. To see this, suppose that at the outset of period ( ) 1 t − , the representative firm was in financial debt. Unable to borrow, it produced In turn, the high price results in a high expected price. Furthermore, the high profit enhances the producers' ability to borrow. The resulting high output in period ( ) . The interpretations of the colors are shown in Table 1 . 10 For example, dark green signifies that producers borrowed at least once, that long-run average profit was negative but that no bankruptcies occurred. Note first the relationship between Fig. 8 and A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 17 possible for bankruptcies to occur even though average profits exceed the stationary profit.
For yet more lax credit limits, borrowing almost invariably results in bankruptcy. As Section 3 confirmed, for unconstrained borrowing, all ( ) , γ α combinations in Region 4 would be red, signifying borrowing leading to losses and to bankruptcy.
Some Concluding Comments
In reality, producers are constrained in their ability to borrow. In reality, producers go bankrupt. Our borrowing constraints and our bankruptcy condition presuppose that the banking community follows very simple behavioral rules. Our model could be extended by allowing credit limits to depend on the history of repayment defaults in this industry; by assuming that the rate of interest depends on the amount borrowed; or by introducing heterogeneity in the financial wealth levels of producers. Such amendments would surely reinforce our central conclusion: industry performance (in terms both of profitability and of the incidence of bankruptcies) is highly sensitive to the nature and degree of credit restrictions.
However simple the behavioral rules of our banks, they are certainly more plausible than the assumption (implicit in standard cobweb models) that banks are prepared to lend any amount to a producer, even to one that is falling further and further into debt. An implication of our model, which involves standard assumptions about costs and demand, is that unconstrained borrowing results in bankruptcies. To put our challenge to the standard nonlinear cobweb model bluntly, a model designed to explain how prices and quantities can involve upper bounds on the growth rates of output, which Huang suggests might be attributable to "capacity constraints, financial constraints and cautious response to price uncertainty by firms" (261). α ≤ ≤ , on long-run profitability, borrowing and bankruptcy for different values of the credit rationing parameter θ . White signifies stationarity; light blue signifies no borrowing and a positive average profit below the stationary profit; dark blue signifies no borrowing and a negative average profit; yellow signifies borrowing (but no bankruptcies) with an average profit above the stationary profit; light green signifies borrowing (but no bankruptcies) with a positive average profit below the stationary profit; dark green signifies borrowing (but no bankruptcies) with a negative average profit; orange signifies an average profit above the stationary profit but with bankruptcies; purple signifies a positive average profit below the stationary profit but with bankruptcies; red signifies a negative average profit with bankruptcies. 
